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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID PUGH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NORTH AMERICAN WARRANTY 
SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 981712 
Defendant/Appellant, North American Warranty Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred 
to as "North American") hereby submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of PlaintifCAppellee, 
David Pugh, (hereinafter referred to as "Pugh"). 
PREFACE 
Pugh contends that North American failed to preserve the issues on appeal or, in the 
alternative, that North American's failure to include the trial transcript as a portion of the 
record deprives this Court of the ability to determine if the issues were preserved on appeal, 
or to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, or to marshal the evidence to successfully 
contest any of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. (Pugh's Brief, pg. 8). These allegations, 
for the reasons set forth below, are without merit. 
First, as noted by Pugh, this case was "by nature, a contract dispute" involving "a 
claim which Pugh made on a Vehicle Service Contract." (Pugh's Brief, pg.3). Prior to trial, 
the parties prepared and presented to the Trial Court a Statement of Stipulated Facts, which 
statement included the subject Vehicle Service Contract and the facts relevant to this case. 
(Findings of Fact, pg. 1). The issues on appeal concern the interpretation and legal effect of 
the Vehicle Service Contract, which is undisputedly a part of the record. 
Second, as also noted by Pugh, there was only one witness, the Appellee, Mr. Pugh. 
Since the nature of the case was one of contract, and the parties stipulated to the relevant 
facts, the trial testimony of Mr. Pugh was unnecessary to the issues on appeal. There was 
no reason for North American to obtain a trial transcript for the appeal since the evidence 
was presented and preserved by the Statement of Stipulated Facts. 
Finally, Pugh's allegation that the failure to designate the trial transcript "by 
definition, makes it impossible for North American to marshal the evidence" is ludicrous, 
and Pugh offers no authority for his position. Again, the material facts and the exhibits were 
presented to the Trial Court by Stipulation. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that a trial transcript is not mandatary, but is discretionary to the parties. 
Since the relevant facts and exhibits were submitted to the Trial Court by Stipulation, North 
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American elected not to obtain a transcript of the proceedings at trial, since a transcript was 
not necessary to the issues on appeal. 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS NOT 
A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE 
A. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACT WAS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
In Conclusion of Law No. 11, the Trial Court concluded that: 
Attorney's fees are recoverable, even in the absence of contract 
or statute, in the case of insurance contracts where the fees are 
foreseeable consequential damages arising form [sic] the 
insurer's breach of its obligations. The warranty contract at 
issue is an insurance contract for the purposes of an award of 
attorney's fees,. . . 
The issue before the Trial Court was whether attorney's fees were awardable as 
consequential damages as a result of the breach of the Vehicle Service Contract. In its 
Answer, North American denied that such consequential damages were available, and the 
award of attorney's fees as consequential damages was also opposed in North American's 
Trial Memorandum. 
Pugh's Complaint did not refer to the Vehicle Service Contract as an insurance 
contract. Pugh also stipulated that he purchased a Vehicle Service Contract, not a policy of 
insurance. Nonetheless, the Trial Court concluded that attorney's fees were awardable as 
consequential damages because the Vehicle Service Contract was an insurance contract, even 
though the pleadings and stipulated facts established otherwise. 
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Under Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125,130 (Utah App. 1997), 
to preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party: (1) must raise the issue before the Trial 
Court; (2) the Trial Court must be aware of the issue; and (3) the party must introduce to the 
Trial Court supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. As set forth above, North 
American challenged the award of attorney's fees as consequential damages in both its 
Answer, and at trial through its Trial Memorandum which contained legal authority. The 
very fact that the Trial Court made Conclusion of Law No. 11 demonstrates that the issue 
was raised before the Trial Court, and that the Trial Court was aware of the issue, but 
rejected the legal authority cited by North American. 
The fact that the Trial Court ruled against North American based on legal authority, 
other than that cited by North American, does not mean that the issue itself, whether 
attorney's fees are awardable as consequential damages, was not raised before the Trial 
Court. The issue was clearly raised, and now it should be reviewed for correctness since it 
is a conclusion of law. 
B. BECAUSE THE VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACT IS NOT A 
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE, THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
(1) The exception allowing for the award of attorney's fees where 
insurance policies are involved must be narrowly construed. 
The Court in Collier v. Heinz. 892 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) stated: 
[A] broad application of Bracey is not reasonable because it 
would eviscerate the general rule; attorney fees would be 
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awarded virtually every time a party is found in breach of its 
contract. 
* * * 
The award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, outside 
the context of statutory and contractual authorization, should be 
limited to the two situations noted above: insurance contracts, 
and the third-party exception. 
The Court continued in Collier: 
. . . No reported decision in Utah has applied the Bracey 
consequential damages theory outside the context of insurance 
contracts. 
Collier at 984. 
Since every contract can be considered to shift risk in one form or another, if Pugh's 
argument prevails, the flood gates allowing consequential damages in every contract case 
would be opened, and the long standing rule that attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless 
expressly provided for by statute or contract would be nullified. Accordingly, this Court 
must narrowly construe any attempt to broaden the Bracey exception. 
(2) The legislature has determined that service contracts are not 
contracts of insurance. 
The Trial Court held that "[T]he warranty contract at issue is an insurance contract 
for the purposes of an award of attorney's fees." (Conclusion of Law No. 11, R/l 52). North 
American, in its initial Brief, addressed this issue in detail, noting that the legislature 
determined specifically that a "service contract" is not a contract of insurance, and 
accordingly, exempted such contracts from the application of the provisions of the Insurance 
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Code. (Utah Code Ann. §31A-l-103(3)(iV). The legislature could have defined "vehicle 
service contracts" as being insurance, and made such contracts subject to the Insurance Code, 
but it did not. The legislature in failing to characterize a Vehicle Service Contract as 
insurance, clearly indicated that service contracts are not insurance. This Court must give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. See Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. 
Co.. 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999); Savage Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n.. 811 P.2d 
664 (Utah 1991); Rowley v. Public Service Commission. 185 P.2d514,112 Utah 116 (Utah 
1947). 
(3) The Vehicle Service Contract is not mechanical breakdown 
insurance. Pugh, at page 13 of his Brief, argues that North American9 s contract with Pugh 
is "mechanical breakdown insurance" policy rather than a "service contract". This argument 
is without merit, or supported by law or relevant code sections. 
First, the subject Vehicle Service Contract was not issued by an insurance company 
as required by Utah Code Ann. §31A-6a-101(l). 
Second, the Vehicle Service Contract provides for incidental payment of indemnity 
under limited circumstances, i.e., rental and towing, which meets the definition of a Vehicle 
Service Contract under Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-101(3)(a). (See Statement of Stipulated 
Facts, Exhibit A, R/52-86). 
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Third, the Vehicle Service Contract is in substantial compliance with the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. §31A-6a-104, for required disclosures for Services Contracts.1 
Fourth, the Vehicle Service Contract does not violate any of the prohibited acts as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-105, since it does not use in the contract words indicating 
"insurance59, "casualty," "surety", "mutual", or any other words descriptive of the insurance, 
casualty, or surety business. Contrary to Pugh's argument, the Vehicle Service Contract, 
by reason of its failure to specifically include the phrases in Utah Code Ann §3 lA-6a-104 
(2) and (11), does not become "mechanical breakdown insurance". 
Mechanical breakdown coverage is issued by an insurance company subject to all the 
statutory insurance code provisions, and is specifically called "insurance". On the other 
hand, the legislature has made it clear that under Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-103(4) and (5), 
service contracts are not subject to the usual licensing and regulations imposed on insurance 
companies and insurance agents. A service contract is merely defined as a "contract" or 
1
 As noted by Pugh, the Vehicle Service Contract does not contain the specific statements 
contained in subparagraphs (2) and (11), but the contract does conspicuously provide that it is 
"Administered by North American Warranty Services, Inc. *2907 Butterfield Road, Oakbrook, 
Illinois 60521*1-800-462-2452" in two locations. The Vehicle Service Contract does identify the 
provider, the seller, and the service contract holder, as provided in subparagraph (3); it does 
conspicuously state the total purchase price, as provided in subparagraph (4); it does conspicuously 
provide the process for approval of repair work, as provided by subparagraph (5); the contract does 
conspicuously state the amount of the applicable deductible, as provided by subparagraph (6); the 
contract does specify the services to be provided and the limitations, exceptions and exclusions, as 
provided by subparagraph (7); it does state the terms governing the transferability, as provided by 
subparagraph (9); and, it does provide the terms governing cancellation, as provided in subparagraph 
(10). 
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"agreement". If both would have been considered insurance, there would have been no need 
for the legislature to enumerate two different types of coverage. 
Pugh next argues, again without citation to any authority, that the Vehicle Service 
Contract has the characteristics of the services of a "Motor Club", and therefore, is subject 
to the Utah Insurance Code. Pugh's reasoning is that the Vehicle Service Contract provides 
for trip reimbursement, towing services, and emergency road services. (Pugh Brief at page 
14). This argument is without merit, since a service contract may, as part of its very statutory 
definition, include additional provisions for incidental payment of indemnity under limited 
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. $31-61-101 (3)(a). 
The Vehicle Service Contract is a service contract as defined by Utah law, and as a 
service contract, it is not insurance. Since the Vehicle Service Contract is not an insurance 
policy, the Bracey exception allowing for consequential damages where an insurance policy 
is involved does not apply. It was error for the Trial Court to award attorney's fees as 
consequential damages. The judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, OR THE EVIDENCE 
A. PUGH FAILED TO PLEAD A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH. 
Pugh argues, at page 15 of his Brief: 
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North American raises, for the first time on appeal, the argument 
that the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential 
damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
performance is error because it was not properly pleaded. 
Pugh's argument is confusing and without merit, since Pugh acknowledges in the very 
next paragraph " the [his] Complaint does not set forth a separately identified cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance,..." Since the issue 
of good faith performance was not an issue raised by Pugh in his Complaint or at trial, the 
first time that good faith performance became an issue was when the Trial Court awarded 
attorney's fees as consequential damages. As such, the first time North American could 
raise this issue was on appeal based upon the error of the Trial Court awarding relief under 
a theory which was not plead or presented to the Trial Court. 
This Court has held that: 
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized pleading rules is to 
afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions that they have pertaining to their dispute, subject 
only to the requirement that their adversaries have "fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved/' 
(Emphasis added). 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc.. 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah App. 1996); 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co..656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). North American was not 
given any notice, in the pleadings or at trial, that the issue of a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith was to be litigated at trial. 
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The theories pled by Pugh for relief were breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
misrepresentation. (R/l A-J). The case was tried to the Trial Court based upon a Statement 
of Stipulated Facts, (R/52-86), which also did not provide for a claim that North American 
breached the implied covenant of good faith of an insurance contract. Since Pugh had not 
pled a breach of a covenant of good faith, it was reversible error for the Trial Court to find 
such a breach. 
B. THE ISSUE OF A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH WAS NOT IMPLIEDLY PLEAD OR LITIGATED. 
Pugh argues in his Brief that the Complaint did "set forth sufficient facts and elements 
to fairly apprize North American" of a claim of the breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith (Pugh Brief, page 15), and that "the tell-tale requests for attorney's fees as 
consequential damages gave North American fair warning that Pugh had incorporated a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance into his Complaint." (Pugh Brief, 
page 16). However, Pugh requested attorney's fees as a "catch-all" in each of his causes of 
action, since none of these causes of action entitled Pugh to an award of attorney's fees. 
Moreover, the facts which Pugh claims support the allegation of breach of good faith are also 
consistent with Pugh's claim of a breach of contract. North American was not given fair 
notice of the claim of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith as is required by Rule 
8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rosenlof v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372,374 (Utah 
1983). Sjmce the issue of good faith was not impliedly plead or litigated, it was error for the 
Trial Court to conclude that there was a breach of the covenant of good faith. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT NORTH AMERICAN 
HAD VIOLATED ITS IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH. 
In the absence of a legal finding that North American had violated its implied duty of 
good faith, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential damages is reversible 
error. As noted in Collier, supra., at 984, "Bracey, Zions, and Beck all dealt with the issue 
of awarding damages when an insurer in some way breaches its contract with an insured". 
(Emphasis added). In this case, there was neither a contract of insurance, nor was there a 
specific conclusion of law that North American breached the implied covenant of good faith. 
The Trial Court did make a number of findings which arguably would support a 
conclusion of a breach of the implied duty of good faith. The Trial Court also made a 
number of findings which would support a conclusion that North American acted in good 
faith. At paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact, the Trial Court found: 
Following the breakdown on May 26, 1997, defendant 
instructed its agent, Ken Riddle, to perform a visual inspection 
and test drive on May 30, 1997. The inspection was timely . . 
. (Emphasis added). 
Since the Trial Court did not specifically find a breach of the covenant of good faith, 
there is no basis for awarding attorney's fees as consequential damages. The Trial Court's 
award of attorney's fees must be reversed. 
D. THE ISSUE OF GOOD FAITH WAS NOT TRIED BY CONSENT. 
Pugh next argues: 
Even if this Court determines that the breach of implied 
covenant of good faith performance theory was not adequately 
pleaded by Pugh in his Complaint, it was nonetheless 
n 
appropriate for the Trial Court to consider evidence submitted 
on the theory and grant recovery thereon because the issue was 
tried by consent. (Pugh Brief, page 16). 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does allow the Trial Court to 
consider and rule on issues not present in the pleadings, provided the issue is "tried by the 
express or implied consent of the parties." In this case, there was neither express or implied 
consent to try the issue of a breach of the duty of good faith. Pugh did not plead a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith, and the evidence, which in this case consisted of the 
Statement of Stipulated Facts, does not demonstrate such an implied consent. 
Pugh next claims that North American's failure to object to the introduction of the 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs submitted by his counsel is evidence of an implied 
consent to try the issue of breach of good faith. (Pugh Brief, page 18). The Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees was submitted without objection by North American since it merely 
summarized the testimony of Pugh's counsel on the subject, and North American did not 
contest the reasonableness of the hours spent, nor the reasonableness of the hourly charge. 
While North American believed that none of the theories pled by Pugh entitled him to fees, 
and objected to their award as consequential damages, the Complaint did contain a request 
for fees. The fact that North American did not contest their reasonableness can hardly be 
construed as an acquiescence to trying an issue not pled, especially where there was a request 
for fees under each cause of action, and there was an objection to their award. 
E. NORTH AMERICAN'S HANDLING OF THE CLAIM WAS 
REASONABLE AND THE CLAIM WAS DEBATABLE. 
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Pugh, at page 20 of his Brief, argues "North American raises for the first time the 
purported defense that its obligation to cover Pugh's claim was fairly debatable55. As noted 
above, this case was tried to the Court based upon Stipulated Facts. The facts that 
demonstrated North American's good faith in handling the claim, and that the claim was 
debatable, included the following Stipulated Facts (R/52-86): 
17. On April 22, 1996, the subject vehicle developed 
transmission trouble. Defendant [North American] paid a claim 
for $1,368.25 to Transmission Exchange to replace the 
transmission with a rebuilt transmission. That payment is 
included with in the total payments set forth in Paragraph 14. 
26. Defendant [North American] instructed Parkway Motors to 
reinstall the transmission pan and fluid so that it could be test 
driven. 
27. On May 30,1997, an agent of Defendant [North American], 
Ken Riddle, came to Parkway Motors to inspect the subject 
vehicle. Pursuant to his instructions from Defendant, Riddle 
visually inspected the transmission and drove the vehicle. 
28. Riddle prepared a report indicating that the transmission 
pan had metal flecks in it, the transmission fluid smelled burnt, 
and there were leaks from exterior housing seal. After test 
driving the vehicle for 11 miles, Riddle noted that the 
transmission shifted roughly into overdrive. A true and correct 
copy of Riddle's report is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
29. After Riddle's test drive, Defendant [North American] 
authorized only the replacement of the rear transmission seal. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Billings v. Union Bankers his. Co., 918 
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996): 
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. . . When an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is 
entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have breached the 
implied covenant if it chooses to do so.. . . 
The first question presented is whether... .a first-party insurer 
may be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the 
ground that it wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's 
claim, although later found to be proper, was fairly debatable 
at the time it was denied. (Emphasis added). 
The Trial Court, as noted by Pugh at page 21 of his Brief, failed to address in its 
Conclusions of Law the issue of whether the claim at the time it was made was fairly 
debatable. The issue was raised by the Stipulated Facts. 
North American paid for numerous and expensive repairs to Pugh's vehicle, including 
the replacement of a transmission a little more than a year prior to the incident which is the 
subject of Pugh's Complaint. (Stipulated Facts, paragraphs 14 and 17, R/52-86). North 
American, upon being advised of Pugh's problem, immediately retained Ken Riddle to 
inspect the vehicle. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27, R/52-86). Mr. Riddle test drove Pugh's 
vehicle without incident, only noticing that the 1990 Ford Thunderbird shifted hard into 
overdrive. (R/52-86). Mr. Riddle noted on his inspection that the cause of the failure was 
"oil leaked from trans seal". (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27, R/52-86). North American 
authorized replacement of the rear transmission seal. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 29, R/52-
86). Pugh demanded a replacement transmission without first determining the extent of the 
damage to his transmission, or if a covered part required replacement. The Vehicle Service 
Contract did not impose upon North American a duty to perform diagnostic tests or 
evaluations, and the Vehicle Service Contract only required North American to repair or 
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replace defective covered parts. (Stipulated Facts paragraph 7, R/52-86). The Vehicle 
Service Contract did not give North American authority to approve diagnostic procedures on 
the transmission. Pugh, however, did have authority to request diagnostic tests, which tests 
could have been completed at a minimal cost. (Tear down costs were $250.00 as indicated 
in Findings of Fact No. 41). 
The failure of the Trial Court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment". Action v. J. B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah 1987). 
The Trial Court failed to make a finding on the critical issue of the debatability of Pugh's 
claim to North American at the time it was made. The facts do not clearly and 
uncontrovertedly support a finding that the claim was not debatable at the time it was made. 
As such, the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APTLY THE 
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF MITIGATION. 
Pugh acknowledged that the appropriate standard under Utah law is that a party 
seeking damages must take reasonable actions to mitigate his damages. (Pugh Brief, pg. 25) 
Utah Courts have held: 
The recognized rule is that where one party definitely indicates 
that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a contract, the 
other is not required to uselessly abide time, but may act upon 
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the breach condition. Indeed in appropriate circumstances he 
ought to do so to mitigate damages. 
University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp.. 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972). 
[t]he nonbreaching party "may not, either by action or inaction, 
aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach, but ha[s] a duty 
to actively mitigate his damages". Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981). See also Angelos v. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 627 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1982); 
John Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 
1990); Reinstatement (Second) of Contracts, Sec. 350 (1981). 
Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Pugh, at page 26 of his Brief, confuses the issue of the tear down costs of the 
transmission with the repair costs of the transmission. Pugh accurately states the Trial 
Court5 s finding that Pugh lacked the financial ability to pay for repair costs. (Finding of Fact 
No. 14, R-148). However, the Trial Court did not conclude that Pugh did not have the 
financial ability to pay the "tear down" costs ($275.00) of the transmission to determine if 
the transmission required repair. The tear down cost is the operative cost to determine if 
mitigation was reasonable and prudent. 
The Trial Court found in Conclusion of Law No. 7 (R/145-154): 
There is no Utah case precisely on point, but a Texas Civil 
Appeals case is instructive, and no Utah case holds to the 
contrary. In Mondragon v. Austin, 954 S.W.2d 191 (Tex App. 
1997), the court held that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate 
damages if he can do so "at a trifling expense or with reasonable 
exertions." IdL at 195. While this court would require mitigation 
to extend somewhat beyond "trifling59 expense, a plaintiff does 
not need to impoverish himself to limit a breaching party's 
exposure. 
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The undisputed stipulated fact was the tear down of the transmission was $275.00. 
North American submits that the sum of $275.00 would be unlikely to impoverish Pugh. The 
Trial Court also ruled in Conclusion of Law No. 7 as follows: 
However, from approximately May 30,1998, when the majority 
of the repair costs had been tendered, Parkway Motors had 
agreed to proceed with repairs, but not release the vehicle until 
the final $225.00 was paid, and four days had elapsed during 
which repair could have been accomplished, plaintiffs 
obligation to mitigate was triggered.... 
It is reasonable to assume that if a bill for $225.00 triggered Pugh's obligation to 
mitigate damages, a bill which was only $50.00 more to determine the extent of the damage 
to the transmission would be reasonable, and also trigger Pugh's obligation to mitigate his 
damages. 
Pugh next argues that subjecting the ailing transmission to diagnostic tests to 
determine the need for repair placed him in jeopardy of voiding the Vehicle Service Contract. 
Pugh points to the provisions of the Vehicle Service Contract where it refers to any 
"alteration, tampering, disconnection, improper adjustment or repairs" and "the administrator 
must be contacted prior to the performance of any repair" and "any repairs performed to the 
covered vehicle not specifically authorized" (Pugh Brief, pg 26). Pugh's argument is without 
merit, as the provisions referenced by Pugh concern alterations and unauthorized repairs, not 
diagnostic tests to determine the existence of damage. 
The reasonable action by Pugh to mitigate his damages would have been to have the 
transmission inspected at a cost of $275.00. Upon verification of the needed repairs, North 
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American would have paid for the repairs, as it had in the past when the need for repairs was 
confirmed. The Trial Court's ruling on mitigation is inconsistent with Utah law, and should 
be reversed. 
POINT IV 
NORTH AMERICAN HAS SUFFICIENTLY 
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
Pugh again argues that since North American did not obtain a trial transcript, this 
Court is incapable of making any determination of the issues. (Pugh Brief, pg 30). The facts 
relevant and binding on the Trial Court were set forth in the Statement of Stipulated Facts 
(R/52/86), which were incorporated by the Trial Court in its Findings of Fact. (R/145-154). 
The facts were stipulated and made a part of the Court record, and are sufficient to enable 
this Court to rule on the issues. The trial transcript was not necessary, and the only 
marshaling required is that which can be gathered from the Stipulated Facts. 
POINT V 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Pugh claims that he should be awarded attorney fees if he prevails on appeal. (Pugh 
Brief, pg. 30). For this conclusion, Pugh references the following as support: 
(a) [T]he rule of law that "a provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at 
trial". 
(Pugh Brief, pg 30) However, there is no contract provision for attorney's fees in this case. 
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(b) [T]he rule of law which permits recovery of contract-
based attorney's fees appeal has been extended to 
domestic litigants. 
(Pugh Brief, pg. 30). This is not a domestic litigation lawsuit, nor is there an applicable 
statute similar to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3, which allows the Trial Court to order a party to 
pay attorney's fees. 
(c) [T]o mechanic's lien claimants based on the statute. 
(Pugh Brief, pg. 31). This is not a lien claim lawsuit, nor is there an applicable statute 
similar to Utah Code Ann. §31-1-18, authorizing attorney fees as in mechanic lien lawsuits. 
(d) [T]o attorney's fees awarded for bad faith. Utah 
Department of Social Services v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
(Pugh Brief, pg. 31). This was a case where the Department of Social Services brought an 
action against an ex-husband for child support. Attorney's fees were based upon the 
Department of Social Service's bad faith and determination that the suit was frivolous. The 
Court also referred to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Dept. at 1198). This case is not on point for the 
conclusion submitted by Pugh. 
Pugh is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed for the reasons set forth by North 
American. 
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